Linguistic competence and cross-cultural negotiations: A Mexican-Norwegian example by Bjørge, Anne Kari & Natlandsmyr, Jan Halvor
Anne Kari Bjørge and Jan Halvor Natlandsmyr*
Linguistic competence and cross-cultural nego-
tiations: A Mexican-Norwegian example
Abstract
In the present paper we look at the connection between level of linguistic competence
and negotiation outcome in cross-cultural negotiations. The corpus consists of six
Mexican-Norwegian dyads participating in a negotiation simulation. The language of
communication was English, which means that none of the participants negotiated in
their native language. The negotiation transcripts were submitted to a qualitative
linguistic analysis and graded according to level of competence. These results were
coupled to negotiation outcome, which was calculated according to a cost matrix. The




According to Bazerman and Carrol (1987:248) “Negotiation is the
process by which two or more interdependent parties who do not have
identical preferences across decision alternatives make joint decisions”.
Its main dilemma is the creation and claiming of value as “both parties
cooperate to reach individual goals while they simultaneously compete
for divergent interests” (Putnam, 1989, cited in Chatman et al.
1991:142). Negotiation is thus a special kind of social interaction
requiring its own set of rules and procedures which distinguishes it
from other types of social interaction.
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In a business world of increasing globalisation there is a need both to
integrate cross-cultural studies with the growing knowledge base of
traditional negotiation research and, furthermore, to link cross-cultural
negotiation research carried out by linguists on negotiating in a second
language to traditional communication research on bargaining. One
important dimension in negotiation research is thus the study of
communication between representatives of different cultures, which
may involve negotiating across language barriers. 
This paper follows up the work of Natlandsmyr and Rognes
(forthcoming), which, on the basis of intra-cultural studies, compares
Mexican and Norwegian negotiation behaviour according to the
dimensions of integrative (i.e. cooperative or problem-solving) vs.
distributive (i.e. competitive)1. This is connected to negotiation
outcome. Using a category scheme proposed by Weingart et al. (1990),
Natlandsmyr and Rognes (forthcoming) could find no substantial
differences in the communication processes, neither in the intra-cultural
nor in the cross-cultural study, although they recognise that this may
explain part of the high outcome variance of the cross-cultural sample.
They did not, however, consider the linguistic competence of the
participants in the cross-cultural negotiations. In this paper we look at
the significance of language command in cross-cultural negotiations by
coupling level of linguistic competence to negotiated outcome. We
propose a qualitative analysis of the linguistic competence of Mexicans
and Norwegians bargaining in English and seek to link it to the
individual  and joint gains achieved.
1.2. Cross-cultural negotiations
Before the 1980s, much of the literature on cross-cultural negotiations
tended to be “fragmented and impressionistic” (Lewicki et al.,
1993:519). The last decade, however, has seen research moving away
from the anecdotal nature of early work, and the cross-cultural aspect
has become an object of research in its own right.
Salacuse (1988) discusses the general framework within which
international negotiations take place. He identifies the following
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1 Their corpus consisted of 24 intracultural dyads (12 from each country) and 6
crosscultural dyads.  In this study our focus will be on the latter. 
fundamental constraints on international business negotiations:
“political and legal pluralism, international monetary factors, the role of
governments and bureaucracies, instability and sudden change,
ideological diversity, and cultural differences” (522). The impact of
cultural differences on the negotiation process has also been treated by
e.g. Graham and Sano (1989) and Le Poole (1989), dealing with
Japanese/American and European/American relationships respectively.
In a Scandinavian context, the work of Fant (1989, 1993) compares the
negotiation behaviour of Scandinavians, Mexicans and Spaniards,
without, however, including negotiations across nationality barriers.
This is the focus of Adler and Graham (1989), who discuss “whether
intra-cultural behavior accurately predicts cross-cultural behaviour”
(1989:515).
Among research focusing on the linguistic aspect, we have the work
of Bülow-Møller (1992) concerning Danish-Danish, American-
American and Danish-American negotiations, and that of Trosborg
(1989), which postulates a set of assumptions concerning the problems
facing the non-native in cross-cultural negotiations.
1.3. Communication research on cross-cultural negotiation
Communication research on negotiations does by its very nature cut
across a number of disciplines, and allows a wide number of
approaches. In a cross-cultural context, one aspect which deserves to be
mentioned is the difference between large and small language
communities, i.e. between those who can expect to use their first
language in a negotiation setting, and those who have to rely on a
second or even third language. While in the American tradition
communication scholars have worked alongside social psychologists
and anthropologists, the main focus in Scandinavia has been on the
linguistic aspect, dealing with the problems facing the non-native
speaker in cross-cultural negotiations. American communication
research on negotiation differs from the traditional research of social
psychologists mainly by its emphasis on communication as more than a
mediator between thought and decision-making (cf. Chatman et al.,
1991), and by focusing on micro-aspects of speech. In Europe the
tradition tends to approach negotiation within the framework of
language for specific purposes in comparing two or more different
languages, which provides a more “skill-oriented” perspective.
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As a tool for analysing the negotiation process communication
researchers have developed different coding schemes that seek to tap
strategies and tactics. Through the use of these schemes researchers
have been able to identify differences e.g. between integrative and
distributive communication tactics.2 Donohue (1984) criticized this
research for not having been able to capture process aspects of
communication in bargaining. In order to include the “connectedness of
utterances” he proposed Sackett’s Lag Sequential Analysis (Sackett,
1979). By defining “criterion events” and the following sequential steps
(lags) LSA makes in possible to calculate the statistical probability that
one event (e.g. asking for information) will be followed by another (e.g.
providing information). Although this approach may have a high face-
validity, we are sceptical to such a positivistic way of dealing with
complex interaction. The fact that the method was developed to study
e.g. mental retardation and mother and child interaction indicates that it
is not unproblematic to adapt it to the bargaining situation3. A recent
negotiation study using LSA, Weingart et al. (op.cit.), yielded
inconclusive results. (For a copy of the coding scheme used by
Weingart, cf. Appendix 1).
Communication researchers have over the last thirty years identified
various dimensions of importance to the bargaining situation. (For a
comprehensive review, see Chatman, op.cit.). They have, however,
been criticised for focusing too heavily on the negotiation process
without linking it to outcome (e.g. (O´Reilly et al., 1987, cited in
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2 Integrative communication tactics are verbal behaviour that presumably has a
positive effect on problem-solving and on the creation of value in bargaining.
Distributive communication tactics, on the other hand, are taken to refer to behaviour
that does not seem to promote the creation of value, only the distribution of it, through
persuasion and competitive moves.
3 Sackett himself (op.cit.) stated that “Not all data are appropriate for sequential
analysis. Whether a data set can be analyzed yielding outcomes that actually answer
questions under study depends on methods of data sampling and behavioral code
definitions.” (p. 629) “The null hypotheses concerning individual probabilities used in
this chapter all assume that the sequential flow of behavor is random. Yet, it is a truism
of behavior that almost everything is correlated with everything else, and that behaviors
that occur close together in time will be more similar than those occurring far apart.
These two “facts” mean that these types of simple null hypotheses will almost always
be rejected. Thus, the lag analysis will always show something significant, as will any
of the concurrent or pattern sequential methods, when a large number of behaviors re
studied. What seems needed is a model-testing rather than a null-hypothesis-testing
approach.” (p. 647).
Chatman 1991)). This is also a major problem in cross-cultural
research. Previous studies have identified differences in negotiation
behaviour across cultures (e.g. Tung (1982), the early work of Graham
(1985) and Fant (1989, 1992, 1993)) without, however, linking their
findings to negotiation outcome. Negotiation is a goaloriented activity
and the outcome is the measure of its success. It could thus be argued
that cross-cultural negotiation research - like other research on
negotiations - is mainly interesting in so far as it helps predict
outcomes.
In a recent study Graham (forthcoming) could only find minor
differences in verbal  behaviours across fourteen cultures (including
Mexico - a finding which was supported by Natlandsmyr and Rognes)
although there were significant differences in negotiation outcomes.
This suggests that present communication research on bargaining has
not been able to develop tools that help predict outcomes neither in
intra-cultural nor in cross-cultural negotiations. 
One main problem facing researchers in the field is a lack of
empirical corpus. Studies such as Fant (1993, op.cit.) operate with a
sample of three negotiations per setting, none of which are cross-
cultural in the sense that negotiators from different countries meet
across the negotiation table, and thus provide data on expected
behaviour in a cross-cultural setting without testing the ensuing
hypotheses.  Graham (forthcoming) provides an impressive  listing of
14 countries including differences in outcome and verbal behaviours.
The negotiations studied are, however, intra-cultural.
Adler & Graham (1989) compare intra-cultural negotiation with
cross-cultural negotiations where the participants negotiate in the
language of one of the participants, i.e. English.  They also discuss the
other linguistic options available in cross-cultural settings, including
situations where both parties negotiate in a third language, i.e. a lingua
franca. Their material, however, does not include such situations. On
the basis of their findings, they conclude that negotiating in a language
that is foreign to one or both parties leads to a high degree of behav-
ioural adjustment (acculturation), which presumably distinguishes
cross-cultural negotiations from intra-cultural negotiations. In this
context, linguistic capability is mentioned as a critical individual
characteristic.
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1.4. Purpose of this paper
In the present paper we are interested in the effect on outcome of
negotiating in a lingua franca, i.e. when neither party is able to
negotiate in their native language. 
2. Conceptual framework
2.1. The significance of linguistic ability
According to Graham (forthcoming), we find the following hierarchy




4. Thinking and decision-making processes
The problems grow more serious as one goes down the list, because
they become more subtle. It is thus easier to pinpoint communication
problems due to language problems than those stemming from different
patterns of thinking. This should not, however, be taken to imply that
the author regards the linguistic aspect as being of little significance. As
an American he is a member of a dominant language group, and he
laments the little attention paid to second or third language learning in
his culture, not least because his experience has demonstrated the
advantage which bilingualism lends to the international negotiator,
from being able to follow internal discussion among the opposite team
- which to monolingual Americans are a source of irritation - to having
the information given twice when using interpreters. We may also add
that target language is never taught in a social vacuum, but is invariably
accompanied by knowledge of the target culture, social phraseology
being a case in point. The loss of the monolingual person is thus not
limited to the ignorance of the meaning of simple words.
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4 The scheme appears to be based on that of Condon (1974, cited in Graham
1989:519) referring to the following cross-cultural communication problems at the
negotiation table: 1. Language and language behaviour, 2. Nonverbal behaviour,
3.Values and 4. Patterns of thought. 
2.2. Linguistic options in cross-cultural negotiations
When members of different language communities meet in cross-
cultural negotiations, they have to decide which language is to be used:
1. They may decide to use the language of one of the participants,
which means that one of the parties will be unable to use his or her
native language.
2. They may use a language which is the first language of neither
party, i.e. a lingua franca.
3. They may use an interpreter.
In choosing among these alternatives one will have to take into account
the linguistic ability of the participants, and also the power balance,
since speaking another person’s language may seem to be making
concessions to the other party.
2.3. Native vs non-native speaker
In cross-cultural negotiations it will generally be the case that at least
one of the parties is obliged to negotiate in his or her second or even
third language. It is reasonable to assume that in contexts involving a
native and a non-native speaker, the non-native will be at a
disadvantage when it comes to expressing a full range of meanings.
Trosborg’s (1989) paper includes a number of assumptions about
problems which may confront the user of a foreign language in
negotiations. Most of these problems can be directly related to lack of
mastery of a foreign language, which makes it difficult for the non-
native to handle awkward situations, e.g. the “[t]endency for most
learners to revert to simplified and often tactless language instinctively
when they find themselves in a situation of conflict” (201). In addition
to the general problem of avoiding too blunt statements (206-07), non-
natives also have problems in taking the initiative and closing a theme
(211-12). The non-native may take comfort from the fact that
experienced international negotiators can “show openness and
tolerance, and the possibility of “softening” the effect of an ill-chosen
word or expression through reformulation and/or clarifying questions
often exists” (216). And according to Dupont (1988:12) “international
negotiators know about these difficulties and act accordingly, showing
some openness and tolerance on the matter, especially since it is always
possible to soften the effect through clever reformulating or clarifi-
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cation”. Bülow-Møller (1992) takes this a step further, stating that there
is “ample anectotal evidence from business people that they consider
that they have often been accommodated to a degree that make it almost
an advantage to be the NNS (i.e. non-native speaker, our note),
especially if extra time was needed for a decision, or a tactical
misunderstanding had to be arranged in order to go back on a decision.”
(13) One would, however, assume that in a less amiable context, where
both parties want to get the maximum profit out of a situation, the
foreigner is placed at a serious disadvantage.
Basing ourselves on Trosborg (211ff), we will outline the following
features characterising foreign speakers of a language, i.e.limited
ability with regard to:
1) taking the initiative, e.g. making proposals, offers and counter-
offers
2) closing a theme of conversation in a quick, polite and diplomatic
way
3) building up a line of argumentation, including the presentation of
counter-arguments and elements of persuasion
4) qualifying one’s statements, e.g. in signalling acceptance and/or
rejection
5) winning and losing arguments without loss of face
6) avoiding threats
The features outlined above are chiefly intended to refer to “advanced
learners of English” (211). However, the same problems are likely to
face non-natives with a poorer command of the language. Dealing with
less advanced speakers, we shall also expect to find 
7) problems due to poor command of basic vocabulary and syntax
8) inability to use phatic devices such as e.g. social phraseology.
2.4. Negotiating in a lingua franca
Both Trosborg and Bülow-Møller deal with contexts involving a native
and a non-native speaker. Frequently, however, both parties will have to
negotiate in a language which is the first language of neither. This
“third” language is used as a lingua franca, which in the majority of
cases means English (Crystal 1985:180). Problems relating to
communicating in a foreign language will thus affect both parties, and
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any asymmetry at the linguistic level will be due to different degrees of
command of the said language. 
Communication between a native and a non-native speaker contains
an inherent asymmetry with respect to language command. Discussing
English as a lingua franca presents a different situation, where one will
find both interlocutors with different levels of second-language
command and participants at the same level of proficiency. With the
exception of cases where one or both parties have a near-native
competence, the communication process will have to do without the
subtleties and full range of linguistic devices which belong to the native
speaker of a language. Secondly, the absence of a native to provide the
“absolute” frame of reference for the language aspect of the
communication process there is always the risk of a communication
breakdown if the linguistic competence of both non-natives is too weak
to clear up misunderstandings. 
Fant (1989:262-64) sets up a number of assumptions concerning “the
over-all organization of dialogue in Hispanic-Scandinavian
interaction”. These assumptions do however not take into account the
problems involved when one or both of the parties are communicating
in their second language. The fact that the channel of communication is
qualitatively different from a native-native situation has implications
for e.g. turn-taking and holding the floor, since limited language ability
will presumably make it more difficult to produce very long stretches of
speech. Interruptions may have the function of clarifying a point, and
interjections signalling attention may be necessary as a means of
indicating comprehension. 
2.5. Linguistic competence and expected outcome
In a negotiation process, language is an essential part of the process
through which a conflict of interests is resolved. If we regard level of
linguistic ability as important to the outcome of a negotiation situation,
a lingua franca negotiation will present us with two different situations:
one where both parties have a (near)equal command, and another where
one of the parties has a higher command than the other. With respect to
the relationship between the parties, one would expect an asymmetry of
competence to give the most proficient speaker an advantage, whereas
in situations of relatively equal command linguistic ability would
feature less prominently.
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Linking language proficiency to negotiation outcome we would
expect that the most proficient speaker in each dyad had an advantage
which would be reflected in the results achieved.
Adler and Graham report differences in outcome between cross-
cultural and intra-cultural settings.  Especially Japanese negotiators
achieved lower (joint and individual) gains in the cross-cultural setting.
Being aware of the language problems facing the Japanese in general,
we may assume that, when negotiating with Americans, linguistic
competence may have contributed to their shortcoming.
In our case, Norwegians generally are regarded as having a relatively
sound command of English, and are probably better than the Mexicans
when it comes to mastery of the spoken language.  This suggests that
the Norwegian negotiators will achieve higher individual gains than
their Mexican counterparts, all other aspects being equal.
Counteracting this expectation, we have the anecdotal references to
situations where native negotiators have done their best to help the non-
native achieve a good result in the negotiating process (e.g. Bülow-
Møller:13, cf. above). This suggests that the Norwegians may be
helpful to such an extent that their linguistic competence is outweighed.
Another aspect mentioned by John Graham at a seminar in Bergen
(March 1994) was that the least proficient speaker may destroy the
effect of elaborate argumentation by asking to have it repeated in
simpler terms. The task of persuasion thus has to yield place to that of
explanation.
Consequently we have contradicting expectations and we pose the
following research question:
Research question 1) How does linguistic competence affect indi-
vidual gain?
Communication research indicates that the quality of the
communication process will influence the level of integrativeness.  This
suggests that dyads characterised by a high level of linguistic
competence will achieve higher joint gain than those exhibiting poor
linguistic command.




The subjects were male students, all but a few at the undergraduate
level. A total of 30 Mexicans and 30 Norwegians participated in the
negotiations. 12 intra-cultural negotiations per country and six cross-
cultural negotiations were carried out. The Mexican-Mexican and
Mexican-Norwegian negotiations took place in Mexico. The subjects
were randomly paired into dyads, and none of them had had any formal
training in negotiating. All the negotiations were video recorded. 
The subjects participated in a negotiation simulation where the
integrative potential was defined by a cost matrix from which they
could deduce their individual outcome. The matrix construction is such
that integrative solutions can only be achieved by giving on one
dimension and taking on another. By giving the participants differential
preferences on two out of three dimensions we prepared the ground for
the give and take process (logrolling) to take place. Similar studies have
reported that it could be a problem that optimal solutions are too easily
obtainable (e.g. Weingart et al., 1990). The options were thus given in
terms of cost instead of profit in line with the findings of Bazerman et
al. (Bazerman and Neale, 1985)5. The subjects were informed that their
bosses had agreed on price and volumes in an earlier meeting, and that
their task was to agree on delivery time, product variations (design) and
terms of payment. In order to get a binding agreement they would have
to agree on all three conditions. They were allowed 15 minutes
(including time to ask questions) in private to read the background
information, and 25 minutes to negotiate. The cost matrixes of the seller
and buyer are given in Appendix 2.
3.2. Levels of linguistic competence
In order to discuss language competence as a contributing factor to the
negotiation outcome we need a set of notions to establish degrees of
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5 This study showed how the framing of the negotiators affected their negotiated
outcome. In line with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) the subjects were
less risk averse when the options were given in terms of costs than in terms of profit.
Consequently, they did not engage in integrative behaviour but used stalling tactics, or
alternatively tried to force the other party to give in to their demands.
proficiency. If we turn to McArthur (1992), we find reference to the
following three levels: 
1. Beginner. “There is often little creative scope, frustration is
common....Performance is usually poor at this stage and dominated by
the mother tongue.” (578)
2. Intermediate. “Much of the learner’s grasp of syntax is now
established, though with gaps and shortcomings. Dependence on
translation (spoken or mental) is less compulsive.” (l.c.)
3. Advanced. Advanced learners “seek delicate discriminations of
meaning, stylistic niceties, subleties of culture and discourse, and
greater acquaintance with the language.” While they may exhibit
“idiosyncrasies and recurring errors, often due to carrying over features
of the mother tongue into the target language”, many learners “achieve
a close approximation to the skills of the native speaker of the target
language”. (l.c.)
These three levels were never intended to present watertight
compartments, nor is class membership permanent - “individuals rise
imperceptibly from one to the other, and may also slip back” (l.c.).
However, since we are looking at recorded pieces of discourse the
candidates’ linguistic development is of no interest.
The frame of reference provided by the three levels outlined above will
need some elaboration to take into account the kind of variation one
would expect to find in contexts involving non-native speakers of a
language. We shall therefore attach some tentative characteristics to the
three levels outlined above.
a. A beginner will have problems in speaking in full sentences. For
this reason he will produce few complete sentences, and have a limited
ability to form complex verb phrases, e.g. using modal auxiliaries.
Restricted vocabulary will lead to repetitions, in dialogues also of
phrases uttered by interlocutor. We may also expect false starts and
hesitation markers, and occasional communication breakdowns or
misunderstandings due to poor language command. No or few set
idiomatic phrases.
b. At the intermediate level we shall expect the ability to produce
connected passages of text featuring sentences containing subordinate
clauses. Since subordination is a characteristic feature of speech (cf.
e.g. Biber 1988:107, 229), its presence alone will not determine level of
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competence, but needs to be coupled with the number of false starts and
incomplete syntactic units. There will be ability to reformulate to get a
point across. Morphosyntactic and other grammatical mistakes will
occur, but not to the detriment of overall comprehension. There will be
a certain command of set idiomatic phrases, e.g. the general formulae
for social intercourse. Since this will be a fairly comprehensive group,
we will find it convenient to divide the group into lower intermediate,
intermediate and upper intermediate, depending on the degree of
competence with respect to the criteria outlined for this level.
c. The competence of the advanced learner will approach that of the
native. We will expect the ability to develop a line of reasoning in
comprehensive passages of speech without making grammatical
mistakes. Modifiers will be used both at phrase and clause level. There
will be few problems in phatic communication and other idiomatic
language. Errors will be at the idiomatic and stylistic level,
misunderstandings will be due to ignorance of cultural factors.
4. Results
Language competence coupled with negotiated outcome
Six dyads represent negotiations between one Norwegian and one
Mexican, three of them featuring a Norwegian buyer and a Mexican
seller, and three where the roles are reversed. If we look at the
individual representatives of each language community, we find all the
Norwegians in the intermediate language competence category, three
lower intermediate, one between lower intermediate and intermediate,
and two of them classified as intermediate. The Mexican group
includes two beginners, three lower intermediate and one intermediate.
The linguistic competence of the Norwegians is thus generally higher
than that of the Mexicans, and in none of the dyads did the linguistic
competence of the Mexican exceed that of the Norwegian. We do,
however, note that none of the participants have a competence that
approaches that of a native speaker. In two dyads the Mexican achieved
the highest score, in two the Norwegian did, and two ended in an equal
score for both parties. If we couple linguistic competence with
negotiated result we can set up the following table:
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Table 1 
Linguistic competence and outcome
Note: beginner = 1, lower intermediate = 2, intermediate = 3
1480 points indicates a perfect integrative (Pareto optimal) joint
solution, whereas 1140 is a purely distributive solution (see Appendix 2
for an explanation of the outcomes). 
It will be clear from Table 1 that there is no one-to-one
correspondence between level of linguistic competence and achieved
result. In fact, the correlation between linguistic competence and
individual gains (Pearson’s r) is -.09. Please note, however, that
conventional statistical tests may be inappropriate due to the limited
size of the sample.
Average linguistic competence for each dyad was negatively
correlated to joint gains (r = - .55). Again, please interpret the numbers
with a great deal of caution. 
If we turn to our research questions, we find the following results:
Research question 1: How does linguistic competence affect individual
gain?
As expected, the overall linguistic competence of the Norwegians
exceeded that of the Mexicans. However, the differences are not
statistically significant (analysis of variance yields p < .14). 
Comments
We note that in two cases, NM-1 and NM-3 both parties achieve (near)-
identical results despite the fact that the linguistic competence of one of
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Dyad Norwegian Mexican
l.c. gains l.c. gains joint
NM-1 buyer 2.5 710 seller 1 730 1440
NM-2 buyer 3 690 seller 2 370 1060
NM-3 buyer 2 660 seller 1 660 1320
NM-4 seller 2 740 buyer 2 740 1480
NM-5 seller 2 410 buyer 2 730 1140
NM-6 seller 3 855 buye 3 335 1190
Mean 2.4 677.5 1.8 594.2 1271.7
(std.dev) ( .49) (147.3) ( .75) (189.7) (169.1)
the participants, viz. the Mexican, is poor. Here, the negotiation process
above the level of exchanging positions hinges on buyer’s (i.e. the
Norwegian’s) linguistic competence. The same applies to clearing up
misunderstandings, e.g. the following exchange from NM-1:
S: What time do you need for pay? in six weeks?
B: If we want to/want the payment you said/in six weeks?
S: Yeah
B: If we get 6 weeks of credit?
S: No/six weeks for delivery/for delivery.
In both cases, the language ability of the Mexican is at times
insufficient to express his meaning, leading to his sentences
occasionally being completed by the Norwegian. We thus see that
the most proficient speaker to a certain extent assumes
responsibility for the progress of the negotiation process, which -
perhaps - may prevent him from maximising his own interests. 
The participants in the four remaining dyads are all at a lower
intermediate or intermediate level. In the case of NM-2 the most
proficient speaker achieves the highest score. In NM-4, NM-5 and NM-
6 the language competence is at the same level: NM-4 gives the same
score for both, while NM-5 and NM-6 gives the highest score to the
Mexican and the Norwegian respectively. 
Research question 2: How does linguistic competence affect joint gain?
There appears to be a negative correlation between the linguistic
competence of the participants and the joint outcome of the negotiation.
Thus, the highest joint score was achieved by NM-4, an evenly matched
dyad at lower intermediate level, and by NM-1, which included one
beginner and one at the (lower) intermediate level. The most proficient
pair, NM-6, only reached fourth place, and the lowest joint score of all,
that of NM-2, was achieved by two speakers at the (lower) intermediate
level. It must, however, be noted that the small sample and the high
degree of variation may give exaggerated importance to one single
observation. 
5. Discussion
In a comparative study Natlandsmyr & Rognes (forthcoming) found
that Norwegian dyads achieved significantly higher joint gains than did
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Mexican dyads. An explorative analysis of the progression of offers
showed that the Norwegians managed to create a high integrative
surplus value after about 6 to 10 exchanges of offers. The Mexicans,
however, only managed to redistribute a fixed sum and, on average,
achieved low joint gains.
If we couple behavioural differences between Norwegians and
Mexicans with linguistic competence we find that the highest linguistic
competence combines with a predominantly integrative behaviour,
while the lowest linguistic competence combines with predominantly
distributive behaviour. Two possible consequences of this may be
suggested: Poor linguistic competence may reinforce distributive
behaviour, since lack of language command makes it safer to stick to
one’s guns. On the other hand, the most proficient - and cooperation-
oriented - speaker,  may feel responsible for the negotiation to reach an
outcome, and yield ground during the process. This would go some way
towards explaining the results achieved by NM-1 and NM3.
Another point concerns the material on which the present discussion
is based. While a laboratory situation like the present one should get rid
of any myths that language competence and negotiation outcome are in
a one-to-one relationship, it also contains a number of limitations. Thus
the nature of the situation allows one of the parties to achieve a good
score merely by repeating his position, e.g. NM-1 and NM-3. 
This strategy would however be impossible in less “closed”
situations. Many of the linguistic weaknesses facing the non-native will
thus be more in evidence in cases like
- building a relationship
- creating trust in a firm’s competence or product, e.g. when trying to
establish oneself in a new market
- gaining preference in a situation where the choice is between near-
equal products
Before concluding, we would like to comment on the limitations of
the present study.  First, our methodological approach is explorative.
The small variations in linguistic competence reported here may be due
to the tentative nature of the classification scheme. Secondly, the use of
a simulation puts a question-mark against the study’s external validity.
As pointed out by our Hermes reviewer, Anna Trosborg, simulations
are low-risk situations. In real life poor linguistic competence may
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increase tension and affect the negotiation process in a negative way.
Another weakness is the expert vs novice problem, since professional
negotiators are usually more self-assertive and aggressive than
students. Finally, one should be wary of drawing too strong conclusions
on the basis of a total sample of 12 subjects. One of the main challenges
of future research will thus be to get access to a substantial amount of
cross-cultural data.
We hope, however, to have demonstrated that more work needs to be
done on the issues involved in lingua franca negotiations, since studies
involving one native speaker represent a qualitatively different
situation. When both interlocutors have a limited command of the
language, there is nobody to provide the absolute linguistic frame of
reference to clear up misunderstandings. As we have seen, this role will
in some cases be taken up by the most proficient speaker. On the other
hand, lingua franca negotiations may lead to interlocutors being less
afraid of asking to clarify a point, since both parties are disadvantaged
linguistically. 
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Appendix 1: Coding scheme (Weingart et al., 1990:17)
1. OFS Single issue offer is made.
2. OFM Multiple-issue, package offer is made (including three-
issue offers, two-issue offers, and offers consisting of
two proposals for other party to choose from) 
3. TR Suggests tradeoff (including suggestion of trade-off and
statementsreflecting mutuality of interests)
4. AS Asks for information from the other party  (including
information concerning what issues are differentially
important; bottom line; more general questions about
needs, desires, and/or goals; asking opponent to sug-
gest/make offer)
5. CO Shows awareness/recognition/concern for other (recog-
nizes differential importance across issues for others;
other less specific empathic reactions; socioemotional
concern, interpersonal concern; paraphrasing; retrie-
ving/reviewing past statements)
6. PI Provides information to the other party (including infor-
mation concerning what issues are differentially impor-
tant; more general statement about needs, desires,
and/or goals; support for position/recommendation to
other)
7. NR Negative reaction to other’s statement (reaction to offer
with or without justification, to idea or argument; nega-
tive affect statement)
8. PR Positive reaction to other’s statement (reaction to offer;
to idea or argument)
9. TH Threats or warnings (including reference to BATNA or
walking away; withdrawal of previous offer;
withdrawal of previous acceptance to an offer)
10. OTH Other
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Appendix 2: Cost matrix buyer and seller
COST MATRIX BUYER
Alt. Delivery time Product variations Financing terms
Costs Costs Costs
A Within 2 ds. 0 9 0 6 months 0
B 1 week 70 8 40 4-5 months 30
C 2-3 weeks 140 7 90 3 months 60
D 4-5 weeks 210 6 130 2 months 90
E 6-7 weeks 290 5 170 6-7 weeks 110
F 8-9 weeks 360 4 210 4-5 weeks 140
G 10-11 weeks 430 3 260 2-3 weeks 170
H 12-13 weeks 500 2 300 1 week 200
I 14 weeks 570 1 340 no credit 230
COST MATRIX SELLER
Alt. Delivery time Product variations Financing terms
Costs Costs Costs
A Within 2 ds. 230 9 340 6 months 570
B 1 week 200 8 300 4-5 months 500
C 2-3 weeks 170 7 260 3 months 430
D 4-5 weeks 140 6 210 2 months 360
E 6-7 weeks 110 5 170 6-7 weeks 290
F 8-9 weeks 90 4 130 4-5 weeks 210
G 10-11 weeks 60 3 90 2-3 weeks 140
H 12-1 weeks 30 2 40 1 week 70
I 14 weeks 0 1 0 no credit 0
Explanation of cost matrixes
Buyers and sellers have opposite preferences.  However, both have a
gross profit for each product of  1140 points (in our case US dollars).
Costs associated with the chosen alternatives are to be deducted from
the gross profit.  Example: a solution based on the choice of C (delivery
time) - D (product variations) - F (financing terms) yields 1140 -
(140+130+140) = 730 points to the buyer and 1140 - (170 + 210 +210)
= 550 points to the seller.  Due to the construction of the cost matrixes,
a perfect (Pareto optimal) integrative solution can be found at A - E - I,
yielding 740 points to both buyer and seller.
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